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Abstract 
In this paper we examine the relationship between learning 
and development from a Vygotskian perspective. While many 
contemporary developmental theorists have avoided taking a stand 
on this controversial relationship, we believe that the notion of 
"bandwidth of competence,'* or Vygotsky's "zone of proximal 
development," provides a useful framework for considering the 
relationship between learning and development. A basic theme of 
this paper concerns the concept of bandwidth of competence 
created by contexts which vary in degree of support for cognitive 
activity. We suggest that these contexts can be overtly social, 
as in the case of adult or peer assistance, or covertly social in 
the case of responding to an imagined or internalized audience. 
We also contend that children create their own zones of 
competence by working recursively on their own theories of 
cognition. Finally, we stress the importance of studying 
processes of change in children's thinking by observing cognition 
over time. 
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Bandwidths of Competence: The Role of Supportive 
Contexts in Learning and Development 
Learning and Development 
How do children learn? How are new modes of thought 
developed? Most would agree that these are the guiding questions 
of a developmental cognitive psychology. The relation between 
learning and development has always been controversial, however, 
and many contemporary developmental theorists avoid taking a 
clear stance on this issue, a fact that reflects the current 
state of flux of developmental theory. But all the traditional 
positions can be recognized today in somewhat disguised form, 
i.e., (a) that learning and development are unrelated; (b) that 
learning and development are identical; (c) that learning 
precedes development; and (d) that development precedes learning. 
Some have interpreted the orthodox Piagetian position as 
adhering to the first position, that learning and development are 
unrelated. Vygotsky (1978) certainly classified Piaget's early 
writings as examples of an independence position and the tenor of 
the introductions to the Genevan work on Learning and Cognitive 
Development (Inhelder, Sinclair, & Bovet, 1974), by both Piaget 
and the authors, suggests that they were aware of the claim of a 
separate and "secondary" status for the concept of learning. The 
opening line is, "It may seem surprising that Genevan 
developmental psychologists have seen fit to write a book on 
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learning." The turn learning, however, was interpreted very much 
in terms of a reinforcement theory, Piagetfs "learning in the 
strict sense (sensu stricto), rather than learning in the broader 
sense (sensu lato) which embraces cognitive development as a 
whole" (Piaget, 1959). On the basis of this definition, Piaget 
could equally well be classed as regarding learning and 
development as inseparable (sensu lato). When making claims 
about any theoretical position on the centrality of learning to 
development, it is essential that one clarifies the concept of 
learning being espoused. Guthrie, Hull, Spence, and Tolman all 
had theories of learning: sorting out the differences between 
them, however, occupied the talents of whole generations of 
experimental psychologists. 
The most explicit version of the learning equals development 
position is the Skinnerian stance, eloquently expressed by Baer 
(1970), who claimed that the concept of development was 
redundant; improvement with age is merely the sum of past 
learning. Perhaps not so readily recognized as a member of this 
camp are extreme versions of universal novice theories of 
immaturity, and simple forms of novice to expert shift 
explanations of development (for criticisms, see Brown, 1982; 
Brown & DeLoache, 1978; Carey, in press). A position that holds 
that development is the result of the acquisition of expertise, 
without recourse to developmental constraints, would be a clear 
example of learning being equal to development. 
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Another recognizable position is that learning is 
prerequisite to developmental. Skills hierarchy approaches that 
postulate the acquisition and automization of subskills leading 
to, or even affording, a restructuring at higher levels are 
examples of this theoretical ideal type (Gagne, 1962). 
And finally, probably the most commonly expressed position 
(at the level of text books) is that development is prerequisite 
for learning. Examples of this include maturational theories, 
certain simplified stage theories, and notions of readiness in 
general. 
The above examples are meant to illustrate that it is 
perfectly reasonable to hold any permutation of the 
learning/development issue and, at least implicitly, 
developmental psychologists do. Many also believe that a 
combination of the above approaches characterizes human 
development (Case, in press; Fischer, 1980), and this was 
certainly the position taken by Vygotsky (1978). In this paper 
we will concentrate on central aspects of Vygotsky1s theory of 
learning and development, most notably the concept of a zone of 
proximal development. 
The Zone of Proximal Development 
Vygotskyfs central interest was in the evolution of 
cognitive processes, in growth and change rather than 
"fossilized," or automated processes of static state cognition. 
Even if one's goal is to understand adult cognition, this does 
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not imply studying cognition in stasis. On the contrary, it is 
necessary to "alter the automatic, mechanized, fossilized 
character of the higher forms of behavior and turn it back to its 
source through experiment [to permit] dynamic analyses" 
(Vygotsky, 1978, p. 64). Vygotsky's "experimental-developmental" 
method was designed so that "one can, under laboratory 
conditions, provoke development" or "create a process of 
psychological development" experimentally (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 
61). Given this emphasis on developing processes of thought, it 
is not surprising that Vygotsky had a special interest in 
children's learning, where one can observe cognitive processes 
"undergoing change right before one's eyes." For Vygotsky, 
developmental analysis was central to psychological 
investigation, not a peripheral offshoot having to do with the 
specialized study of children. 
Vygotsky intended the notion of a zone of proximal 
development to capture the widely recognized fact, then and now, 
that "learning should be matched in some manner with the child's 
developmental level" (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 85). But he went 
farther, by arguing that one cannot understand the child's 
developmental level unless one considers two aspects of that 
level: the actual developmental level and the potential 
developmental level. "The zone of proximal development is the 
distance between the actual developmental level as determined by 
independent problem solving and the level of potential 
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development as determined through problem solving under adult 
guidance, or in collaboration with more capable peers" (Vygotsky, 
1978, p. 86). The actual developmental level is the result of 
"already completed developmental cycles." When a child's ability, 
or competence, is assessed on some static, independent test, this 
measure reflects his actual level of development; and this is 
true whether the measure is a standardized test or the laboratory 
experiment familiar to developmental psychologists. 
An example of a static test of actual developmental level 
would be the estimate of an average five-year-old's performance 
on a particular task purportedly measuring a particular cognitive 
process. Many researchers stop here; this is certainly the 
primary method of testing children if articles in the major 
developmental journals are representative of the field. But what 
if one does not stop here, and like Piaget in his clinical 
interviews, one "offers leading questions" or, like Vygotsky, one 
demonstrates "how the problem is solved" or "initiates the 
solution and the child completes it"—in short what if the child 
"barely misses an independent solution of the problem" (Vygotsky, 
1978, p. 85) and is helped by a supportive environment to achieve 
a greater level of competence? As Vygotsky posed the problem: 
Suppose I investigate two children upon entrance into 
school, both of whom are ten years old chronologically and 
eight years old in terms of mental development. Can I say 
that they are the same age mentally? Of course. What does 
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this mean? It means that they can independently deal with 
tasks up to the degree of difficulty that has been 
standardized for the eight-year-old level. If I stop at 
this point, people would imagine that the subsequent course 
of mental development and of school learning for these 
children will be the same, because it depends on their 
intellect. Of course, there may be other factors, for 
example, if one child was sick for half a year while the 
other was never absent from school: but generally speaking, 
the fate of these children should be the same. Now imagine 
that I_ do not terminate my study at this point, but only 
begin it. These children seem to be capable of handling 
problems up to an eight-year-old's level, but not beyond 
that. Suppose that I show them different ways of dealing 
with the problem. Different experimenters might employ 
different modes of demonstration in different cases: some 
might run through an entire demonstration and ask the 
children to repeat it, others might initiate the solution 
and ask the child to finish it, or offer leading questions. 
In short, in some way or another I propose that the children 
solve the problem with my assistance. Under these 
circumstances it turns out that the first child can deal 
with problems up to a twelve-year-old's level, the second up 
to a nine-year-old's. Now, are these children mentally the 
same. (Vygotsky, 1978, pp. 85-86, emphasis added) 
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Vygotsky argues that what children can do with the assistance of 
others is "even more indicative of their mental development than 
what they can do alone" (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 85), a point to which 
we will return. 
The zone of proximal development marks boundaries of 
competence within which a child can navigate with and without 
aid. At the lower boundaries are those "fruits" of 
"developmental cycles already completed," a conservative estimate 
of the child's status. At the upper bound are the estimates of 
just emerging competences that are actually created by the 
interactions of a supportive context. By considering both levels 
of the spectrum, one has a better estimate of a child's potential 
and, in addition, by observing the process of change as it occurs 
microgenetically one learns a great deal about development 
(Brown, 1982). 
The zone of proximal development permits us to estimate the 
child's "immediate future and his dynamic developmental state" 
(Vygotsky, 1978, p. 90). It is important to note, however, that 
what the child can do now in social interaction becomes, in time, 
part of his independent repertoire. Social interaction creates 
zones of proximal development that operate initially only in 
collaborative interactions. But, gradually, the newly awakened 
processes "are internalized, they become part of the child's 
independent developmental achievement" (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 90). 
What is the upper bound of competence today becomes the 
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springboard of tomorrow's achievements. 
Because Vygotsky concentrated primarily on social contexts 
for creating competence, he placed a heavy emphasis on imitation 
as the well-spring of learning, arguing that a "full 
understanding of the concept of the zone of proximal development 
must result in réévaluation of the role of imitation in learning" 
(p. 82). To this end, Vygotsky pointed out that a person can 
imitate only that which is within her developmental level; the 
point is made clearly in the following obvious example: 
For example, if a child is having difficulty with a problem 
in arithmetic and the teacher solves it on the blackboard, 
the child may grasp the solution in an instant. But if the 
teacher were to solve a problem in higher mathematics, the 
child would not be able to understand the solution no matter 
how many times she imitated it. (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 88) 
In common with current language development theorists, Vygotsky 
believed that knowing what a child is ready to imitate is knowing 
a great deal about her underlying competence. 
But imitation is not the only driving force of progress. 
Vygotsky also emphasized such socially directed activities of a 
more knowledgeable other as providing prompts to a more mature 
solution, directing leading questions, forcing the child to 
defend or change his theory, etc. In this respect, Vygotsky had 
much in common with early (contemporary to him) Piagetian theory 
(The Language and Thought of the Child, 1926, and Judgment and 
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Reasoning in the Child, 1928) where it was also argued that the 
development of logical thought is enhanced by the need to defend 
one's ideas to actual or imagined audiences. The notion of 
supportive contexts creating new levels of competence can include 
contexts other than the overtly social. 
Outline of Paper 
A basic theme of this paper will be the concept of 
bandwidths of competence, or zones of proximal development 
created in contexts that vary in degree of support. These 
contexts can be overtly social as in the case of adult or peer 
assistance (Section II) or only covertly so in the case of 
modifications in thinking in response to an imagined or 
internalized audience. We will also argue that children create 
their own zones of competence by working recursively on their own 
theories (Section III). In Section IV, we will discuss how 
developmental psychologists, sometimes unwittingly, create 
supportive contexts to reveal and perhaps even accelerate 
development. Two themes that run throughout the paper are: (a) 
the importance of studying processes in change, of observing 
cognition over time, or microgenetic analyses espoused by both 
Vygotsky and Genevan psychologists, and (b) the overriding 
concept of supportive environments for learning. Finally we will 
argue that a consideration of zones of proximal development at 
the very least permits us to consider the central issue of 
learning and development in a somewhat different light. 
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Social Interactions as Contexts for Learning 
The Genesis of Individual Thinking in Social Settings 
The claim that individual thought processes might have their 
genesis in social interactions is not unique to Vygotsky; in his 
early work, Piaget also considered the role of social experience 
in development. In particular, Piaget regarded peer interaction 
as an ideal forum for helping children "decenter" their thinking 
from one particular egocentric perspective and consider multiple 
perspectives; such social settings also provide incentives to 
coordinate opposing egocentric views, and hence arrive at a more 
mature sociocentric consensus. Faced with a group of peers who 
not only fail to accept one's own views but hold opposing 
opinions of their own, the child must compromise. In the process 
of compromising the group produces a solution that is more mature 
than each individual effort. The conflict arising from group 
disagreement creates disequilibrium and the resulting adjustment 
to this state is a primary cause of cognitive development. 
In his early work, Piaget stressed that a great deal of 
development was mediated by just such social interactions (see 
Doise, Perret-Clermont, and Mungy for recent Genevan work on 
social interaction, and Forman, 1982, for a discussion). In 
addition, Piaget claimed that we internalize such interactions to 
form the basis of individual cognition, especially in the case of 
logical thinking: 
The adult, even in his most personal and private occupation, 
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even when he is engaged on an inquiry which is 
incomprehensible to his fellow-beings, thinks socially, has 
continually in his mind's eye his collaborators or 
opponents, actual or eventual, at any rate members of his 
own profession to whom sooner or later he will announce the 
result of his labours. This mental picture pursues him 
throughout his task. The task itself is henceforth 
socialized at almost every stage of development . . . the 
need for checking and demonstrating calls into being an 
inner speech addressed throughout to a hypothetical opponent 
whom the imagination often pictures as one of flesh and 
blood. When, therefore, the adult is brought face to face 
with his fellow beings, what he announces to them is 
something already socially elaborated and therefore roughly 
adapted to his audience. (Piaget, 1926, p. 59) 
In the middle part of this century, American social 
psychologists interested in group dynamics also became concerned 
with the group as a learning context for individual cognition. 
For example, Bales (1950) argued that individual problem solving 
and group problem solving are necessarily similar, as the one 
(individual) is born of the other (social). 
Individual problem solving is essentially in form and in 
genesis a social process: thinking is a re-enactment by the 
individual of the problem-solving process as he went through 
it with other individuals. (Bales, 1950, p. 62) 
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Similarly, Kelley and Thibaut (1954) put forward a theory of 
internalization similar to Vygotsky's when they suggested that an 
individual: 
• . . acquires his thought and judgmental habits largely 
through interaction with other persons. It is by no means 
entirely fanciful to suppose that he 'internalizes' certain 
problem-solving functions that are originally performed for 
him by others. For example he may internalize a 'critic' 
role in the sense of learning to apply to himself the same 
standards and rules of critical evaluation that another 
person has previously manifested in interaction with him. 
(Kelley & Thibaut, 1954, p. 738) 
Vygotsky, however, went further and argued that not only do 
individual thought processes have their genesis in social 
interaction but that individual mental processes share 
organizational properties in common with the social situations 
from which they were derived. It follows that variations in the 
social interactions to which a child is exposed would have 
important consequences for the development of certain forms of 
thinking, hence the importance given by neo-Vygotskians to such 
crucial interactions as those between peers, siblings, parent and 
child, and teacher and child, the primary socialization agents of 
the young (Rogoff & Wertsch, 1984). 
Bandwidths of Competence 
15 
Internalization of Executive Control 
What kinds of social interactions, likely to occur in 
groups, are important processes for individual thinking? Those 
who have been concerned primarily with adults have stressed the 
internalization of executive control, critical thinking, 
Socractic dialogue ploys, or metacognition—whatever your 
theoretical bias would lead you to call activities that create 
and revise, oversee, question, elaborate, and control premises, 
arguments, and problem solutions (Brown, Bransford, Ferrara, & 
Campione, 1983). For example, Dashiell came very close to 
discussing executive control when he described the six shared 
group activities that a participant might internalize as part of 
personal cognition: 
(1) motivation by some felt difficulty, (2) analysis and 
diagnosis, (3) suggestion of possible solution or 
hypothesis, (4) the critical tracing out of their 
implications and consequences, and perhaps (5) an 
experimental trying out, before (6) accepting or rejecting 
the suggestion. (Dashiell, 1935, p. 1131) 
Shaw (1932) also noted that one major function of the group 
was that it acts as a form of executive to its individual 
members. For example, the initiator of a suggestion will reject 
his own plan only one-third as often as will other members of the 
group. The group members function together to reject inadequate 
plans that escape the notice of individuals working alone. And 
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Bales (1950) describes the central role of such executive 
routines as (a) asking for, giving, repeating, and clarifying 
information, (b) asking for and giving directions, and (c) asking 
for and suggesting ideas or plans for possible lines of action. 
Thus, a major function of the group is that it makes overt many 
of the executive critical functions that are usually hidden when 
an individual works alone. Kelley and Thibaut (1954) suggest 
this essential role of critic and evaluator, first learned in 
interpersonal settings, becomes internalized as a set of self-
regulatory skills, all favorite Vygotskian concepts. 
The internalization of executive control, or the transition 
from other-regulation to self-regulation (Brown & French, 1979; 
Wertsch, 1979), has also been a major focus of developmental 
psychologists studying mother-child dyads. One of the most 
commonly reported examples of this type of interaction is mother-
child dyads working on the construction of wooden block puzzles 
(Wertsch, 1979). The following is a sample of a videotaped 
interaction between a mother and her 2-1/2 year old daughter: 
(1) C: Oh (glances at model, then looks at pieces pile). Oh, 
now where1s this one go? (picks up a black cargo square, 
looks at copy, then at pieces pile) 
(2) M: Where does it go in this other one (the model)? (child 
puts black cargo square back down in pieces pile, looks at 
pieces pile) 
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(3) Ms Look at the other truck (model) and then you can tell, 
(child looks at model, then glances at pieces pile) 
(4) C: Well (looks at copy, then at model) 
(5) C: I look at it. 
(6) C: Um, this other puzzle has a black one over there, 
(child points to black cargo square in model) 
(7) M: Um-hm. 
(8) C: A black one (looks at pieces pile). 
(9) M: So where do you want to put the black one on this (your) 
puzzle? (child picks up black cargo square from pieces pile 
and looks at copy) 
(10) C: Well, where do you put it there? Over there? (inserts 
black cargo square correctly in copy) 
(11) M: That looks good. 
Wertsch argued that this is an example of the mother serving 
a vital regulatory function, guiding the problem-solving activity 
of her child. Good examples of the mother assuming the 
regulatory role are statements 2, 3, and 9, where she functions 
to keep the child on task and to foster goal-relevant search and 
comparison activities. This protocol represents a mid-point 
between early stages, where the mother and child speak to each 
other, but the mother's utterances do not seem to be interpreted 
by the child as task relevant, and later stages, where the child 
assumes the regulatory functions herself, with the mother 
functioning as a sympathetic audience. Detailed observations of 
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adult executive control come from such divergent situations as 
those of language acquisition (Greenfield, 1984; Scollon, 1976), 
picture book reading (DeLoache, in press; Ninio & Bruner, 1978), 
memory tasks (Rogoff & Gardner, 1984), story telling (McNamee, 
1981), reading comprehension (Au & Kawakami, in press; Palincsar 
& Brown, 1984), and number games (Saxe, Gearhart, & Guberman, 
1984), as well as block play. 
Shared Task and Goal Structures 
Especially with very young children, social interactions do 
not always serve to highlight executive control of action 
patterns in a clearly defined problem space. In order to be 
sensitive to the gradual transfer of the executive role the child 
must have a quite sophisticated concept of what the task is. 
Often, however, children and adults share very different concepts 
of the goal structure of the problem, and what appears to be 
joint activity on a common task is much more akin to parallel 
play: adult and child interact with the concrete task but share 
little in the way of a common goal; indeed, they may often fail 
to share a common attentional focus. 
Under such circumstances, either the adult or the child must 
begin an interaction by catching the attentional focus of the 
other. Excellent examples of these preliminary goal setting 
activities have been recorded by Rogoff observing adults1 
interactions with her twins (Rogoff, Malkin, & Gilbride, 1984). 
Adults attempt to elicit mutual gaze with 4—7 month old twins by 
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such common attention getters as "did you see that?" "what 
happened?" "lookit," etc., just as four-year-olds do with two-
year-old playmates (Shatz & Gelman, 1973). But as Rogoff et al. 
(1984) point out, this orchestration of shared attention does not 
always proceed strictly from adult to child as the children 
themselves actively involve themselves in situations that allow 
learning to occur. "Together the adult and child calibrate the 
appropriate level of participation by the child" (p. 43). One 
example of the.child controlling the interaction appears when the 
boy twin, at nine months, is playing when he catches sight of an 
attractive toy, a Bugs Bunny Jack-in-the-Box. He pushes it 
toward the adult and continues to pat the top until the adult is 
drawn into the game and works the mechanism for the baby. After 
the Jack has popped* out, the adult tries to draw the child's 
attention to another game, but the baby "fidgets and whines." As 
the adult persists in the alternate game, the baby "grabs the box 
again, whining louder." This struggle of wills continues until 
the baby "raises his hands over his head in frustration and 
fatigue!" The adult capitulates and turns the handle of the 
desired box, asking sympathetically, "Is that what you wanted?" 
The toy is activated; the baby smiles; pulling the toy toward 
him, now calm (Rogoff, 1982). 
Rogoff provides a variety of examples of the child as the 
participant who determines which toy will be selected; the baby 
initiates the action, the adult follows his lead. In the example 
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above, the baby seems to have been determined to play with the 
Jack-in-the-Box, not settling for the adult's attempts to 
interest him in other games. The baby was active in choosing the 
toy and seeking participation in its use. It would be erroneous 
to characterize the child's part in such interactions as the 
passive recipient of others' goals and instructions. 
In general, however, the child's goal structure is the one 
that undergoes the major adaptation because it is usually the 
adult who has a clearly defined goal in mind; this is 
particularly true when the adult is engaged in deliberate 
teaching of academic-like skills. A major role of the "expert" 
in such situations is to get children to change their conception 
of the task in favor of a more strategic, economic or 
academically sound approach. Wertsch (1984) has argued that one 
of the major changes that children undergo in the zone of 
proximal development is that they accept a qualitatively 
different interpretation of the goal of the joint activity. It 
is the expert's role to define an appropriate goal, to segment 
the task into manageable subunits, to arrange interactions at the 
child's level, and to change her demands in keeping with the 
child's growing expertise. This implicit teaching role is more 
clearly seen in activities that are similar to academic learning 
settings, when the child is playing a game with number 
correspondence (Saxe et al., 1984), reading (Palincsar & Brown, 
1984), or story telling (McNamee, 1981). In other situations 
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that are more clearly play-like, the adult's role can be much 
more like that of an equal, engaged in parallel play or often 
taking the lead of the child. 
The Centrality of Instruction 
One common feature of the type of interactive situations in 
which children often find themselves is that adults adopt, either 
implicitly or explicitly, a teaching function. It is this 
natural instructional role that is a mainstay of development. As 
Wertsch (1984) points out, the Russian word obuchenie actually 
means the "teaching-learning process," and it is this symbiotic 
function that is central to Vygotsky's theory (see Wertsch, 1984, 
for a detailed discussion). Obuchenie "creates the zone of 
proximal development," it 
rouses to life, awakens and sets in motion a variety of 
internal processes of development in the child. At this 
point, these processes are still possible for the child only 
in the sphere of interaction with surrounding people and in 
the sphere of collaboration with peers. But these 
processes, which constitute the course of internal 
development, then become the internal property of the child 
himself or herself. (Vygotsky, 1962, p. 450) 
It is important to note that the teaching function of 
interactional situations need not be explicit, or be the central 
agenda of the activity. We have already seen that a group 
problem solving setting is said to provide a learning forum for 
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its members, even though the guiding activity is successful 
problem solution, regardless of individual contributions or the 
potential for personal development. Similarly, many of the 
situations examined by those interested in the zone of proximal 
development are informal apprenticeship settings where the 
teaching function is a minor part of the total activity. Typical 
of learning in informal settings is a reliance on proleptic 
teaching (Brown & Campione, in press; Rogoff & Gardner, 1984; 
Wertsch & Stone, 1979). Proleptic means "in anticipation of 
competence" and in the context of instruction refers to 
situations where novices are encouraged to participate in a group 
activity before they are able to perform unaided, the social 
context supporting the individual's efforts. The novice carries 
out simple aspects of the task while observing and learning from 
an expert, who serves as a model for higher level involvement. 
In many cultures children are initiated into adult work 
activities such as weaving (Greenfield, 1980, 1984), tailoring 
(Lave, 1977), marketing (Lave, Murtaugh, & de la Rocha, 1984), 
etc. without explicit formal instruction (Cole & Bruner, 1971; 
Cole & Scribner, 1975). The expert members of the group have as 
their main agenda the task of weaving, tailoring, etc. and are 
only secondarily concerned with initiating the novice, or 
overseeing the progress of the apprentice. It is the adult who 
take on most of the responsibility for getting the task done with 
the child participating as a spectator, then a novice responsible 
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for very little of the actual work (Laboratory of Comparative 
Human Cognition, 1983). As the apprentices become more 
experienced and capable of performing more complex aspects of the 
task, aspects that have been modeled by adults time and time 
again, they are ceded greater and greater responsibility until 
they become experts themselves. Within these systems of 
tutelage, novices learn about the task at their own rate, in the 
presence of experts, participating only at a level they are 
capable of fulfilling at any point in time. 
The main features of informal proleptic instruction are very 
different from formal schooling. In informal learning situations 
the group has responsibility for getting the job done, or at 
least an illusion of joint responsibility is maintained. 
Children join in, often on their own initiative or with seemingly 
little pressure from the adults; they participate only at the 
level they are currently able to perform, or just beyond. They 
are rarely allowed to fail because errors are costly to 
production of a concrete product, the major task at hand. 
Everyone has the same, clearly-defined agenda, the name of the 
game is known to all, the goal is clear. The adults (experts, 
mastercraftsmen) model appropriate behavior and occasionally 
guide novices to increasingly more mature participation. There 
is rarely any demand for solo performance on the part of 
children, indeed it is often difficult to measure any child's 
individual contribution because everyone is participating at the 
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same time. Children perform well within their range of 
competence; rarely are they called upon to perform beyond their 
capacity; the adults do not expose the children's ignorance, but 
jointly benefit from their increasing competence. Above all, 
such teaching is implicit; a Zinacanteco woman (expert 
weaver), asked how girls in her society learn to weave, claimed 
that they learn by themselves! (Greenfield, 1984). 
Although adults in apprenticeship systems may not be aware 
of their instructional function, closer examination certainly 
reveals that they do teach, and the teaching style they adopt has 
a readily identifiable structure. Greenfield (1984; see also 
Wood, 1980; Wood & Middleton, 1975), in examining common features 
of informal instruction in language acquisition and in weaving, 
identifies six common elements to the two informal learning 
situations: (a) the degree of aicl, or scaffolding, is adapted to 
the learner's current state; (b) the amount of scaffolding 
decreases as the skill of the learner increases; (c) for a 
learner at any one skill level, greater assistance is given if 
task difficulty increases, and vice versa; (d) scaffolding is 
integrated with shaping, i.e., local correction and aid are given 
in response to the child's current performance; (e) the aid or 
scaffolding is eventually internalized, permitting independent 
skilled performance; and finally (f) in both the language and 
weaving contexts, the teachers appear to be generally unaware of 
their teaching function. 
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The instructional role, however, can sometimes be quite 
explicit and this has been the general rule in American studies 
of mother-child, teacher-child interactions, for the 
mothers/teachers have been set to teach the child explicitly by 
the experimental context. But even given the change from an 
implicit to explicit teaching role, Greenfield's six elements 
describe the proleptic teaching role quite well (see Au & 
Kawakami, in press; Brown & Palincsar, in press; Palincsar & 
Brown, 1984, Tharp et al., 1984). To illustrate, we will give 
one example of mother-child interaction (Saxe et al., 1984) and 
one of teacher-child dialogues (Palincsar & Brown, 1984). 
Saxe, Gearhart, and Guberman (1984) examined mothers as they 
attempted to teach their 2 1/2-5 year old children a number 
reproduction game. The goal was to match pennies with cookie 
monsters; a number of cookie monster pictures (set sizes 3, 4, 9, 
and 10) was placed on a board and the child's task was to select 
from a set of 15 the same number of pennies, put them in a cup 
and take them to the mother. The mothers introduced and 
controlled the task differently as a function of the starting 
competence of the child. Mothers of low ability children began 
with a single array subgoal, such as, "count the cookie 
monsters." With higher level children, however, they began with 
statements such as, "You have to get the same number of pennies 
as there are cookie monsters," and indirect requests intended to 
help focus the child on the need to achieve a numerical 
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representation of one of the arrays without specifying the means 
for doing this. In short, the mothers adjusted their degree of 
aid to the learner's current status. 
Mothers also adjusted their degree of aid as a function of 
task difficulty, e.g., increasing set size, by giving more direct 
assistance and more explicit prompts. Some mothers of high 
ability children referred back to previous easy set sizes in 
order to guide their children. Mothers also organized the task 
differently as the child became more competent. In addition, 
they responded locally to each individual move on the part of the 
child; they shifted down to a goal directive simpler than, and 
subordinate to, the previous higher one if the child produced an 
inaccurate count and shifted up to a superordinate, less 
explicit, directive if the child had succeeded. Just as did the 
weavers in Greenfield's studies, the mothers provided scaffolding 
and shaping for their child's efforts. They adjusted the goal 
structure (superordinate or subgoal) to the child's level, 
shifting it up or down depending on the child's attainments and 
the perceived task difficulty. 
Next, we will consider one example from our own work of an 
explicit attempt to make instruction in the schools more like the 
natural tutoring procedures of proleptic teaching (Brown & 
Palincsar, in press; Palincsar & Brown, 1984). Junior high 
school poor learners, with particularly depressed reading 
comprehension scores, were taken from their traditional formal 
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reading instruction and placed in a reciprocal teaching 
environment (Brown & Palincsar, 1982, in press; Palincsar & 
Brown, 1984), In reciprocal teaching, students of varying levels 
of competence and an adult teacher take turns "being the 
teacher," that is leading a dialogue on a segment of text they 
are jointly attempting to understand and remember. The "teacher" 
responsible for a particular segment of text leads the ensuing 
dialogue by stating the gist in her own words, asking a question 
on that segment, clarifying any misunderstandings and predicting 
what might happen next. All of these activities are embedded in 
as natural a dialogue as possible, with the adult teacher and 
students giving feedback to each other. 
Close inspection of these dialogues revealed repeated 
examples of guided learning, i.e., where the adult teacher 
provided modeling, feedback, and practice to students at a level 
that appeared to match the student's current need. As students 
became better able to perform some aspects of the task, the 
teacher increased her demands accordingly, until the students' 
behavior became increasingly like that of the adult model, who in 
turn decreased her level of participation and acted as a 
supportive audience. 
One example of such an interaction is shown in Table 1. 
This dialogue took place between an expert teacher and a seventh 
grade minority student, Charles (IQ = 70, Reading Comprehension 
grade equivalent • Third Grade). 
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Insert Table 1 about here. 
At the beginning of the training session, Charles was unable 
to formulate a question. The teacher, estimating that he is 
having more than usual difficulty with the task, opens her 
interaction by stating the main idea (Statement 2). She 
continues to lead him, asking for a "why" question (4) but, 
receiving no response, she resorts to forming a question for him 
to mimic (6). Even imitating a fully formed question is 
difficult for Charles (7, 9). Again, on Day 4, the teacher 
formulates the question (20), but this time she waits until 
Charles comes very close to an adequate question by himself. As 
Charles improves, the teacher demands more from him. On Day 4, 
the teacher does not open by providing the main idea, she probes 
for it (14) and probes for a question (16, 18), which she 
corrects (20). Note, however, that although the teacher actually 
produces the questions on both Day 1 and Day 4, on Day 4 she 
waits until Charles has contributed most of the elements himself. 
As Charles1 ability to participate increases even further, 
the teacher again increases the level of participation that she 
demands from him. On Day 7, she requests a modification to his 
question form (23), but he formulated the question (24). By Day 
11, she receives two excellent questions, but now demands only 
one (27), i.e., she requires him to stick to the exact rules of 
the game. Finally, by Day 15, Charles can perform his part unaided. 
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Charles and Sara were part of a reading tutorial which met 
regularly with the same expert teacher. Charles was a 
particularly weak student at the start, unable to formulate 
questions at all. Sara, in contrast, began the intervention with 
a clear notion of the kinds of questions that occur in school— 
"fill in the blanks." Excerpts from her protocol are shown in 
Table 2. On Day 2, the teacher, who has tolerated "fill in the 
blanks" questions until this point, attempts to take the student 
beyond this level (2) and asks for a main idea rather than a 
detail question. 
Insert Table 2 about here. 
On Day 3, Sara comes up with a main idea question as 
requested (3), so again the teacher increases her demands by 
suggesting that, instead of selecting a line from the text, the 
student summarize in her own words, a process called invention 
(Brown & Day, 1983) that is difficult for weaker students to 
handle. For the remainder of the sessions, Sara's questions are 
classified primarily as inventions. The teacher has been 
modeling inventions, and the student has followed suit. 
Turn now to observations of a regular classroom teacher 
leading her reading group according to the reciprocal teaching 
method. In Table 3, we see excerpts from the third day of 
instruction using this method and in Table 4 are excerpts from 
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the thirteenth instructional day. The group consisted of one 
adult teacher and five seventh grade poor readers. 
Because of the larger group size, compared with the 
tutorial, the students were able to provide modeling and feedback 
for each other, learning from their peers as well as from their 
teacher. As the sessions progressed, the teacher was able to 
hand over a great deal of the work to the students and serve more 
as a coach than a teacher. An illustration of this change is 
shown in the contrast between the dialogue samples in Table 3, 
where the teacher is in control and the students interact almost 
exclusively with her, and that of the later session from the same 
group, shown in Table 4, where the students respond to each other 
with encouragement from the teacher. 
Insert Table 3 and 4 about here. 
Both the Day 3 and Day 13 dialogues attest to the fact that 
the students and teacher were able to engage in a smooth flowing 
discussion. On Day 3, however, the teacher is very much the 
pivotal participant. As can be seen in Table 3, one session of 
the silent reading is followed by one extensive dialogue, where 
the students interact with one another only once (statements 1 -
3); the remainder of the runs are S-T, S-T, student followed by 
teacher. The students interact individually with the teacher, 
not with each other. Note also that the entire interaction 
focuses on one segment of text and on one disputed point—the 
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use of snakes' tongues. Interestingly, other reading groups had 
problems with this segment, one student reading, "No snake's 
tongue is completely harmless," instead of the correct, "No, -
snakes' tongues are completely harmless," thus generating an 
interesting confusion and occasion for clarification. 
The same group is seen again, ten intervention days later, 
in the dialogue shown in Table 4. Here, four reading-dialogue 
sets are included in 29 statements, rather than only one as in 
Table 3. Now the majority of the "runs" are student-controlled, 
with the teacher interspersing praise and encouragement (4, 10, 
12) and some management (4, 14, 21). The teacher only intercedes 
with advice and modeling when a student misses the point and the 
other students do not catch it (statements 18, 26, 28). The 
teacher has moved from the pivotal role of responding 
individually to each child, to a coach who sits in the 
background, offers encouragement, and occasionally pushes for a 
better interpretation of the text. The expert provides just the 
degree of scaffolding necessary for the dialogues to remain on 
track, leaving the students to take as much responsibility as 
they can. 
In practical terms, the results of the reciprocal teaching 
intervention were dramatic. The students clearly internalized 
the types of interactions they had experienced, improving not 
only in their ability to paraphrase the gist and ask questions of 
clarification, interpretation and prediction, but also in their 
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ability to assume the role of teacher, producing their own 
questions and summaries, and evaluating those of others. In 
addition, the intervention resulted in dramatic improvements on 
laboratory, classroom, and standardized tests of comprehension. 
The participating students progressed from the very poorest 
performers in the class to the average level set by their 
normally achieving age mates. But perhaps more important, the 
child's feelings of personal competence and control improved 
dramatically, enabling them to go farther and improve their 
skills on their own (Brown, Palincsar, & Purcell, in press; Reeve 
& Brown, in press). The teachers also adhered to the six steps 
described by Greenfield (1984), adjusting their level of control 
to the child's products and the difficulty of the task. The 
students gradually internalized the teacher's procedure so that 
they could perform unaided. Expert teachers perform these 
adjustments without necessarily being aware of the fine-tuning of 
the reciprocal interaction in which they are engaged. 
Interactions such as these examples of mother-child, 
teacher-child, expert-novice dialogues have a central place in 
learning and provide a major impetus to cognitive growth. 
According to Vygotsky (1978), teaching-learning, or obuchenie, 
creates development, which in turn determines the level at which 
teaching-learning can be directed. Learning and development are 
interwoven in a complex spiral pattern, none of the four 
alternatives mentioned in the introduction fully capture the 
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flavor of this relationship. Certainly, however, such a position 
is not consistent with either the position that learning and 
development are unrelated or that they are identical. 
Instruction creates a zone of proximal development within which 
learning can occur. 
Learning is not development; however, properly organized 
learning results in mental development and sets in motion a 
variety of developmental processes that would be impossible 
apart from learning. Our hypothesis elaborates the unity 
but not the identity of learning processes and internal 
developmental processes. (Vygotsky, 1978, pp. 90-91) 
Needless to say, there remain many unanswered questions 
concerning social interactions as contexts for individual 
development. Stimulating as Vygotsky's ideas might be, the zone 
of proximal development is a concept in need of validation. 
Social interactions do not always create new learning; some 
parents are surely more effective teachers than others; peer 
interactions vary enormously, only some creating ideal learning 
experiences. We need a great deal more research addressing such 
questions as: (a) What kinds of interactions are maximally 
effective at inducing cognitive growth? (b) Can optimal 
interactions be orchestrated deliberately? (c) To what extent do 
social collaborations lead to independent competence? (d) What 
are the mechanisms underlying internalization? etc. In short, 
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Vygotsky provided a blueprint for research, but supportive 
contexts need to be delineated in far greater detail. 
Dynamic Assessment 
Implicit in the adult-child dialogues we have been 
considering is the notion of on-line diagnoses. In order to be 
responsive to the child's "region of sensitivity to instruction" 
(Wood & Middleton, 1975), the expert must continually define and 
refine her theory of the child's existing state of learning. As 
such, the interactions in the zone of proximal development must 
involve an implicit diagnostic activity. 
Vygotsky was also concerned with a more explicit diagnostic 
function; he had a pressing practical interest in using the 
concept of a zone of proximal development for diagnostic 
purposes. As Director of the Institute of Defectology in Moscow, 
Vygotsky was faced with the practical task of designing 
educational assessment procedures that could take the place of 
Western IQ measures, which, as we have seen, he regarded as 
retrospective estimates of past learning rather than prospective 
predictions concerning potential developmental trajectories. 
Therefore, the notion of a zone of proximal development had a 
central place in Vygotsky's work on assessment, and it continues 
to play a major role in Soviet clinical diagnoses and remedial 
training (Egorova, 1973; Vlasova, 1972; Wozniak, 1975; Zabramna, 
1971). 
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For practical reasons then, Vygotsky needed a way of 
estimating both actual and potential developmental levels, and 
this is reflected in the passage quoted previously where he gives 
the example of two ten-year-olds with actual mental ages of eight 
years, one of whom can, with the experimenter's help, perform at 
a twelve-year-old level and the other who can perform only at a 
nine-year-old level. If a practical method could be found where 
such differences could be measured, Vygotsky believed they would 
have both diagnostic and instructional significance (Brown & 
French, 1979; Vygotsky, 1978; Wozniak, 1975). 
In the work on the zone of proximal development described so 
far, the primary interest has been in observing the child's 
assisted progress in the zone of proximal development created by 
various forms of social interaction. Rarely have investigators 
considered the other aspect of Vygotsky's theory, that the fruits 
of the zone of proximal development created in the interaction 
will be internalized and become part of the independent 
repertoire of the child and this change can be measured. One 
exception is the work of Palincsar and Brown (Brown & Palincsar, 
in press; Palincsar & Brown, 1984) where independent measures of 
learning and transfer were taken in addition to estimates of 
progress within the interaction. But for assessment purposes, 
one needs to estimate independent progress, i.e., Vygotsky's 
imaginary ten-year-old who gains four years is different from the 
one who gains only one. Although both children "failed" in their 
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unassisted attempts to solve the problem, both benefited from 
instruction, but the first child was far more "ready" to receive 
instruction than the second. The subsequent careers of 
spectacular "gainers" (Budoff, 1974) is the central interest of 
many psychologists concerned with dynamic assessment; the most 
notable proponent being Reuven Feuerstein (1979, 1980), who also 
developed his Learning Potential Assessment Device when faced 
with the practical assessment problem of evaluating children in 
displaced person camps who had spent years without systematic 
formal education (Feuerstein & Richelle, 1963). Static 
standardized ability and achievement tests are even less 
appropriate for children for whom the assumption of appropriate 
consistent formal education cannot be held (Brown & French, 
1979). 
In our own work on diagnostic zones of proximal development 
(Brown & Campione, in press; Brown & Ferrara, in press; Campione, 
Brown, & Bryant, in press; Campione, Brown, Ferrara, & Bryant, 
1984), we have taken the idea of systematically measuring aspects 
of assisted learning one step further. Like Vygotsky and 
contemporary Soviet investigators (Egorova, 1973; Vlasova, 1972), 
we assess children's independent performance first on variants of 
a problem to estimate a level at which they cannot perform 
without assistance and then on other variants, after the 
interactive sessions. In addition, however, we also measure the 
degree of assistance a particular child requires during the 
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interactions. For example, a child is set to learn an inductive 
reasoning problem such as a series of matrices problem similar 
to the Raven Progressive Matrices test of intelligence (Raven, 
1938), or a double classification task (Bryant, Brown, & 
Campione, 1983), or a series completion task (Ferrara, Brown, & 
Campione, 1981; Simon & Kotovsky, 1963). Initially the child 
performs poorly; she is then given a series of such problems 
accompanied by a standard set of prompts or hints. The hints are 
structured in a general to specific sequence with the initial 
hints being quite nonspecific, "Is this problem like any other 
you have seen?" "Can you see a pattern?" Subsequent hints, 
which become more and more concrete and specific, are given as 
the child needs them. We estimate the amount of help needed on 
both learning and transfer sessions. 
Consider some concrete examples. The problems shown in 
Figure 1 are matrices type problems. The child's job is to 
figure out how the missing figure in the lower-right corner of 
each problem should look. A computerized testing situation was 
developed in which the child could construct the missing figure 
using a touch-sensitive panel and could receive graduated 
animated hints from the computer with the touch of a button 
(Campione, Brown, Ferrara, Jones, & Steinberg, in press). 
Insert Figure 1 about here. 
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Initially, the children learned each of three rules— 
rotation, addition (imposition), and subtraction. The top 
problem in Figure 1 is a rotation problem. In such problems, the 
left-most figure in each row is rotated 90 degrees to the right 
to obtain the figure in the center, and that figure is then 
rotated another 90 degrees to the right to obtain the right-most 
figure. The second problem in Figure 1 is an addition problem 
and the third problem a subtraction example. The children were 
provided with a practice box in which they could try out various 
manipulations (e.g., rotation) on the various items. If the 
children could not solve a problem unaided, they requested and 
received a series of hints from the computer (in one study, or 
from an experimenter in another). These hints ranged from 
general to specific, and later hints in the series consisted of 
an animated demonstration of the rotation, addition, or 
subtraction movement. The children continued using the practice 
box, generating solutions and requesting hints, until they could 
solve two consecutive problems of each type without aid. 
Following learning, maintenance and transfer sessions were 
given. In the first session, the students attempted to solve 
maintenance problems. These were the same three types already 
learned to criterion—rotation, addition and subtraction—but 
they were presented in a random order. The students had to 
identify the type of problem, i.e., discover which rule applied, 
and then construct the correct answer. 
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On subsequent sessions, both maintenance and transfer items 
were given, the maintenance items interspersed among novel 
transfer items. Transfer matrices are illustrated in the fourth 
problem in Figure 1, they involved a combination of two of the 
rules learned initially in the context of separate matrix 
problems. The answer to the example in Figure 1 would involve 
rotating the left-most figure in each row 90 degrees to the right 
and superimposing that rotated figure on the one in the middle 
column to generate the right-most item. Items of this type 
appear on the adult superior version of the Raven's matrices 
test. 
In a series of such studies, we have found that the degree 
of aid needed to learn and transfer solutions in inductive 
reasoning domains is an extremely sensitive index of individual 
differences. Slower and younger children need more aid to reach 
the same degree of initial learning. As the degree of change 
from the initial learning situation to the transfer probes 
increases, ability-related differences also increase. Of greater 
importance is that learning and transfer efficiency, measured as 
degree of help given by the adult (or adult plus computer), is a 
sensitive predictor of long-term improvement within the domain. 
For example, using a double classification matrices task with 
five-year-old children, Bryant, Brown, and Campione (1983) 
considered the change from static pre-test to static post-test 
that took place after the interactive sessions. Even after the 
Bandwidths of Competence 
40 
effects of IQ, pre-test scores, scores from the Raven Coloured 
Progressive Matrices (another intelligence test) on the gain 
scores were statistically removed, a considerable amount of the 
variance in improvement was attributable to the amount of aid 
needed to learn and transfer (approximately 20% in each case). 
Alternatively, if one looks at simple correlations, the best 
predictor of improvement from the pre- to the post-test was 
performance on far transfer items, followed by transfer indices 
and then learning efficiency. It would appear that individual 
differences in the degree of assistance needed for learning and 
transfer in interactive sessions is an important predictor of 
independent improvement within a domain. As such, these indices 
serve important diagnostic functions over and above that which 
could be provided by static tests, as Vygotsky predicted. 
This diagnostic function would be particularly important if 
guided learning and transfer assessments such as the above could 
be designed to test readiness within common academic subject 
areas. If a teacher, in addition to knowing a child's static 
test scores, could also gauge a particular child's readiness to 
learn in situations such as mathematics or reading, she could 
tailor her instruction accordingly. Diagnosis is only important 
if it leads to remediation (Binet, 1909; Brown, in press). For 
this reason, we are currently devising dynamic assessment 
measures of early mathematic skills as well as extending our work 
on reading comprehension. 
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Children as Creators of their own Zones of Competence 
In the previous section we have emphasized the importance of 
social interaction for creating zones of proximal development; 
guided by an expert who provides the essential scaffolding, the 
child progresses to greater levels of first social and then 
independent competence. But we should not overlook the fact that 
microgenetic analyses of children working alone suggest that 
children create and extend their own zones of competence without 
aid from others. Of course one could argue, as did Piaget and 
Vygotsky, that even when apparently working alone, the child is 
interacting with an imagined, internalized audience. 
We believe that it would be a mistake to overemphasize the 
conception of children as other-directed, i.e., always guided in 
their learning by outside forces. Behaviorist theories were also 
theories of other-directed guidance, guidance conceived in terms 
of a variety of external reinforcements that shape behavior, and 
a simple interpretation of Vygotskyfs theory could also lead to 
an overemphasis on guided learning where parents, peers and 
instructors always instigate development. Interesting and 
important though these guided learning situations may be, we 
should be careful not to concentrate exclusively on external 
pressures in knowledge acquisition. Even though children are 
undoubtedly observers and imitators of adult behavior; even if 
they learn primarily in this fashion, they are also capable of 
actively orchestrating their own learning. We have seen this is 
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true even for the very young learner in interactive situations, 
witness Rogoff's example of the nine-month-old initiating the 
game of Jack-in-the-Box. It is equally important to acknowledge 
that children learn in situations where there is no obvious 
guidance, no feedback other than their own satisfaction, and no 
external pressure to improve or change. In a very real sense 
they act as little scientists, creating theories-in-action 
(Karmiloff-Smith, in press) which they challenge, extend, and 
modify on their own. The child is not only a problem solver but 
a problem creator—a metaphor that has much in keeping with 
scientific thinking. 
Some of the best evidence of self-motivated learning comes 
from situations in which children are observed as they operate on 
a problem, over considerable periods of time, without external 
pressure, and seemingly with no motivation other than to improve 
the theory on which they are working. In this section we will 
illustrate this point by describing some examples of our own work 
on self-directed learning followed by a discussion of neo-Genevan 
microgenetic studies of learning (Karmiloff-Smith & Inhelder, 
1974/75; Karmiloff-Smith, in press). 
Errors and Self-Correction 
In collaboration with Judy DeLoache, Mary Jo Kane, and Susan 
Sugarman, we have conducted a series of studies on young 
children's self-directed learning. We have been particularly 
interested in error correction procedures as a function of age 
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and task complexity, and in the similarity of the microgenetic 
progression within and across ages that children seem to undergo 
when they operate on an interesting problem, producing and 
correcting errors and solutions on their own volition. Consider 
first a group of 24-48 month old children videotaped as they 
engaged in free play with a set of five nesting cups (DeLoache, 
Sugarman, & Brown, in press). Although the children saw the cups 
nested before they began to play, there was no real need for them 
to attempt nesting themselves; however, they did so, working long 
and hard in the process, and there were no age differences in the 
likelihood that they would eventually achieve a correct 
seriation. There were, however, interesting differences with age 
in the children's strategies for improving their systems. 
The most primitive strategy, used frequently by children 
below 30 months, was brute force. When a large cup was placed on 
a smaller one, the children would press down hard on the non-
fitting cup. Variants of brute pressure were twisting and 
banging, but the same principle held; the large cup will fit into 
the smaller one if only one can press hard enough. 
A second strategy initiated by some of the younger children 
was that of local correction. After placing two non-fitting cups 
together children removed the top cup and did one of two things: 
They either looked for an alternative base for the non-fitting 
cup or tried an alternative top for the original base. Both 
ploys involved minimal restructuring and necessitate considering 
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the relation between only two cups at any one time. The third 
characteristic ploy of children below 30 months was to respond to 
a cup that would not fit into a partially completed set of cups 
ky dismantling the entire set and starting again. 
Older children (30-42 months) faced with a non-fitting cup 
engaged in strategies that involve consideration of the entire 
set of relations in the stack. For example, one sophisticated 
strategy was insertion; the children took apart the stack at a 
point that enabled them to insert the new cup in its correct 
position. A second strategy, reversal, was also shown by older 
children. After placing two non-fitting cups together, children 
would immediately reverse the relation between them (5/4 
immediately switched to 4/5). 
The rapidly executed reversal strategy was not shown by the 
younger group. Some young children would repeatedly assemble, 
for example, cups 4-1, starting with 4 as a base and then 
inserting 3, 2, and 1. Then they encountered the largest cup, 
that is, 5, and attempted to insert it on top of the completed 
partial stack, pressing and twisting repeatedly. When brute 
force failed, they would dismantle the whole stack and start 
again. Similarly, having assembled 1, 2, 4, and 5 and then 
encountering 3, the younger children1s only recourse was to begin 
again. 
Although there are clear age differences in the efficiency 
with which the children strived to achieve a seriated stack, note 
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that even the very youngest children persisted at the task, 
corrected their own errors, and made progress toward a goal, 
without any obvious external pressure to do so; that is, they 
formulated and tested their own theories-in-action. 
It would appear that this form of progression, from brute 
force and local correction to a consideration of the problem as a 
whole, is a general acquisition mechanism. For example, a very 
similar trend is seen in older (4-7 years) children attempting to 
construct a railway circuit (Karmiloff-Smith, 1979a; Kane & 
Brown, work in progress). Children are shown cardboard pieces of 
track that, if assembled correctly, will make a railway circuit 
for a small toy train. They are then shown a more complex 
version, and, given tracks, asked to make one like that 
themselves. One solution is to alternate the straight and curved 
pieces. Another is to put together four curved pieces into 
arches at the top and bottom and join each arch with two straight 
pieces. These correct constructions are shown as (a) and (b) in 
Figure 2. The children are left alone to complete the circuit. 
Insert Figure 2 about here. 
Many of the youngest children begin by placing any randomly 
selected piece next to any other and hence end up in a position 
that cannot possibly lead to solution. Examples are shown in 
panels (c) and (d) of Figure 2. Of interest is what the children 
do now. Even the youngest persist in their efforts, but their 
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strategies change with age and experience in a way quite 
analogous to the stacking cups task described above. 
The first line of attack is the brute force approach; the 
children try to make the tracks fit by firmly pushing them 
together to close up gaps. This is followed by local correction, 
the children remove the last few pieces and try to fix them but 
ignore the rest of the construction that is equally in need of 
work. The third stage is the one where the children, seeing the 
trouble they are in, disassemble the entire construction, and 
start again, even though part of the construction could be 
salvaged. These early strategies are essentially identical to 
those developed by much younger children as they attempt to 
seriate nesting cups. 
The more mature strategies on the railway task also parallel 
those developed to deal with the cups assembly task. These 
strategies involve viewing the construction as a whole, thus 
enabling the children to rearrange only those pieces that need 
rearranging, leaving correct sections intact. Often the 
corrections involved the strategic reversal of already joined 
pieces, or insertion of a critical straight (curved) piece. 
Finally, some efficient learners actually dismantled a perfectly 
workable system and reconstituted a new version, pointing out 
that there were several solutions to the one problem. This 
developmental progression was seen both across ages (macrogenetic 
change) and within an age group (microgenetic change) when 
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children were given a long time to work on the problem 
(Karmiloff-Smith, 1979a). It was also seen when children were 
asked to fix up disasters created by other children; and hence 
the level of problem difficulty could be kept constant across 
ages (Kane & Brown, work in progress). 
Similar microgenetic trends can be seen if one considers 
much older children (12 years old) revising their own written 
compositions. An early correction strategy is again local 
correction, trying to fix up one local error even though the 
entire production is much in need of revision. This is followed 
by the disassembly ploy, where, realizing the need for massive 
revision, the child jettisons his whole initial efforts and 
starts again, even though parts are salvagable. Finally, with 
practice at revising, the child comes to master the type of 
activities that result from a consideration of the product as 
whole, inserting needed clarification and reversing the order of 
existing segments. Although the analogy with the two-year-old 
nesting cups is somewhat far-fetched, the similarity in the 
microgenetic pattern is intriguing. 
For all of these examples, we can ask, why do the children 
bother? Implicit in the situations is the goal; that the cups 
should be seriated, a workable railway should be constructed, an 
acceptable composition should be written, etc.; but the children, 
remain free to leave the field whenever they like. But they 
persist; they persist even in the face of frustration; they 
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persist for long periods of time; they persist, correcting their 
own errors time and time again. Perhaps even more impressive 
evidence of this persistence and self-control comes from studies 
by Annette Karmiloff-Smith (1979a, 1979b, in press) where young 
children are seen correcting and perfecting their productions 
even after a perfectly adequate solution has been reached. 
Reorganization and improvement in strategies are not solely 
responses to failure, but often occur when the child has quite 
adequate functioning procedures but seeks to improve them. It is 
not failure that directs the change, but success—success that 
the child wishes to refine and extend. We will illustrate this 
point with one example from Karmiloff-Smith. 
Theories in Action 
In a landmark paper, Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder (1974/75) 
examined children, from four to nine years of age, as they played 
with a set of balancing blocks. Their task was to play with the 
blocks and balance them on a narrow metal rod fixed to a long 
piece of wood (see Figure 3). These were no normal blocks, 
Insert Figure 3 about here. 
however. Standard blocks had their weight evenly distributed, 
and the correct solution was to balance them at the geometric 
center. Weight blocks had the weight of each "side" varied 
either conspicuously (by gluing a large square block to one end 
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of the base rectangular block) or inconspicuously (by inserting a 
hidden weight into a cavity on one end of the rectangular block). 
At first, the children made the blocks balance by brute 
trial and error using proprioceptive information to guide action. 
Behavior was purely directed at the goal of balancing. This ploy 
was obviously successful; the children balanced the blocks. In 
this sense they had met the goal set them, the blocks all 
balanced; they could stop at this point. But they didn't stop 
here even though by some criteria they had "finished" the game; 
they had met the goal of achieving balance. Without any external 
pressure to do so, they set about testing and revising theories 
to uncover the rules governing balance in the miniature world of 
these particular blocks. Their initial theories involved 
incomplete rules that produced errors. A common early theory was 
to concentrate exclusively on the geometric center and attempt to 
balance all blocks in this fashion. This works for standard 
unweighted blocks but not for weighted blocks of either kind. 
Here the theory did not result in balance, so the weighted blocks 
were discarded as exceptions ("impossible-to-balance"), even 
though the child had previously been able to balance them all. 
After this theory was well established and working well for 
unweighted blocks the child became discomfited by the number of, 
and regularity of, the impossible-to-balance set. A new 
juxtaposed theory was then developed which incorporated the 
conspicuous weight blocks. For these, the children compensated 
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for the weight that was obviously added to one end and adjusted 
the point of balance accordingly. Inconspicuous weight problems 
still generated errors; they looked identical to the unweighted 
blocks and were, therefore, subjected to the dominant geometric 
center rule. When they did not conform to the theory they were 
discarded as anomalies that were "impossible-to-balance." The 
children's verbal responses reflected these juxtaposed solutions, 
with exclusively length justifications given for unweighted 
blocks and weight justifications given for conspicuously weighted 
blocks. 
After establishing and practicing the juxtaposed theory, the 
young theorists were again made uncomfortable by the remaining 
exceptions to their own rules and began to seek a rule for them. 
In so doing, a reorganization was induced that resulted in a 
single rule for all blocks. The children paused before balancing 
any block and roughly assessed the point of balance. Verbal 
responses reflected their consideration of both length and 
weight, e.g., "You have to be careful, sometimes it's just as 
heavy on each side and so the middle is right, and sometimes it's 
heavier on one side." After inferring the probable point of 
balance, and only then did the children place the block on the 
bar. 
The progression from procedures that fail to procedures that 
work, shown in the stacking cups and railway track examples, can 
be explained in terms of goal-directed learning, the child wishes 
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to correct errors. But in the blocks example, the pressure to 
work on adequate partial theories to produce more encompassing 
theories is very similar to what occurs in scientific reasoning. 
Like scientists, it is essential that children first gain control 
of simple theories in their quest for a more complex and more 
adequate theory. Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder refer to this as 
creative simplification: 
The construction of false theories or the overgeneralization 
of limited ones are in effect productive processes. 
Overgeneralization, a sometimes derogatory term, can be 
looked upon as the creative simplification of a problem by 
ignoring some of the complicating factors (such as weight in 
the block study). This is implicit in the young child's 
behavior but could be explicit in the scientist's. 
Overgeneralization is not just a means to simplify but also 
to unify; it is then not surprising that the child and the 
scientist often refuse counterexamples since they complicate 
the unification process. However, to be capable of unifying 
positive examples implies that one is equally capable of 
attempting to find a unifying principle to cover 
counterexamples. (Karmiloff-Smith & Inhelder, 1974/75, 
p. 209) 
Progress comes only when the inadequate partial theory is 
well established and the learner is free to attempt to extend the 
theory to other phenomena. In this way the theorists, be they 
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children or scientists, are able to discover new properties that 
in turn make it possible for new theories to be constructed. 
There can be little doubt that children, even very young 
children, do work unaided on their own theories, creating and 
extending their own levels of competence and sophistication as 
they do so. Note, however, that these self-directed improvements 
would not be apparent if one were to maintain the tradition of 
considering only one-shot, static estimates of the child's 
competence. Indeed, Karmiloff-Smith has emphasized that cross-
sectional age trends are often indistinguishable from 
microgenetic changes within a child over relatively short periods 
of time (Karmiloff-Smith & Inhelder, 1974/75; Karmiloff-Smith, 
1979a, 1979b, in press). To estimate a child's current cognitive 
status, one must be very careful in the type and extent of 
performance one captures in order to estimate competence. An 
added complexity is that just as similarities in processing, such 
as revealed in the nesting cups and railway track examples, do 
not necessarily result in identical end products, identical end 
products do not necessarily implicate the same underlying 
processes. Evidence of early competence does not necessarily 
imply an equivalence in the underlying cognitive processes that 
are used to solve easy and difficult versions of the same task 
(Thornton, 1982); modified versions of traditional tasks may not 
be conceptually equivalent to traditional tasks (cf. Dean, 
Chabaud, & Bridges, 1981). By the same token, similar 
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performances on a single task should not be taken as evidence for 
similar cognitive processing in two different age groups. Again, 
a microgenetic approach in the more likely method to reveal 
similarities and differences in process and product alike. The 
notion of zones, or bandwidths of competence through which the 
child navigates, with or without assistance, could be a more 
fruitful metaphor for theory development than that of a static, 
frozen, snapshot in time which predominates in the developmental 
literature. 
Task Environments and Supportive Contexts 
Demonstrating Cognitive Precosity 
Developmental psychologists also collaborate with children 
to reveal bandwidths of competence by providing contexts that 
vary in the support they provide for learning. Indeed, a 
predominant interest of developmental psychologists in the past 
few years has been the game of demonstrating that contrary to 
theory X, Y, or Z, preschool children have much more competence 
than was supposed ( see Gelman, 1978; Gelman & Brown, in press, 
for reviews). This controversy for Piagetians centered around 
the transition from preoperational thought to concrete operations 
said to "occur" between five and seven years of age (roughly), 
and for learning theorists of several persuasions, it also took 
the form of questions concerning a putative five-to-seven shift 
(White, 1965). Disputed were such issues as whether a 
qualitative shift occurred between non-mediated learning in the 
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preschooler to mediated learning in the older child (Kendler & 
Kendler, 1962; Zeaman & House, 1963). Similarly, a shift from 
absolute to relational learning was also under contention (Brown 
& Scott, 1972; Kuenne, 1946; Reese, 1968). For those interested 
primarily in memory development, the controversy concerned the 
existence and extent of strategic processes prior to the onset of 
formal schooling (Brown, 1975; Brown & DeLoache, 1978; Wellman, 
Ritter, & Flavell, 1975). 
In all of these domains, researchers had considerable 
success demonstrating preschool competence, and the methods they 
used were similar. The guiding principle was to look for 
evidence of cognitive precosity, not only in the traditional 
laboratory tasks, but also in situations where preschool 
competence could most readily be shown. To considerably 
oversimplify the comparative literature, the two major techniques 
used to expose early competency have been (a) to strip away all 
but the most essential elements of the task in order to reveal 
its cognitive demands in the simplest possible form and (b) to 
situate the experiment in the familiar, i.e., in task settings 
compatible with preschoolers' interests and knowledge. 
A combination of these two techniques marks the better 
cross-cultural experimental work (Laboratory of Comparative Human 
Cognition, 1983) and also reveals early competence in preschool 
children. For example, Shatz (1978) argued cogently that earlier 
(or later) competence in communicative situations can readily be 
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accounted for by the excess baggage of the task. In unfamiliar 
situations, with arbitrary stimuli, where the children must 
expend considerable cognitive effort identifying the items and 
comprehending the nature of the game, they appear unable to 
communicate adequately with a peer. In situations where the game 
is familiar, the information to be conveyed is meaningful and, 
therefore, cognitive "capacity" is freed for the communicative 
aspect of the task, the younger children look far more 
reasonable; they communicate well. Flavell and his colleagues 
(Salatas & Flavell, 1976; Flavell, 1977) have also shown that 
complexity and familiarity are important factors leading to a 
diagnosis of egocentricism in children. Similarly, Gelman and 
her colleagues (Gelman, 1978, 1983; Gelman & Baillargeon, 1983; 
Gelman & Gallistel, 1978) have made this point quite graphically 
for several "concrete" operational tasks. And many investigators 
have shown the importance of complexity and familiarity in 
revealing or disguising the memorial sophistication of small 
children (Brown & DeLoache, 1978; Deloache, 1980, in press; 
Perlmutter & Myers, 1979; Sophian, in press; Wellman & 
Sommerville, 1982). 
We will illustrate this research trend with a glance at the 
history of one problem solving task, first examined in rats, and 
then entended to more and more child centered versions of the 
basic problem (Crisafi & Brown, 1983). The task, originally a 
Hullian (1952) classic, was said to measure inferential reasoning 
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(Maier, 1936), though not by Hull. It involved the ability to 
combine two separately learned pieces of information to reach a 
goal. A schematic version of the original Hullian maze is shown 
in Figure 4. For example, a hungry rat would be placed at box 
Insert Figure 4 about here. 
B and trained to run to G, the goal, for food. In a second 
separate part of the study, the rat, now thirsty, would be placed 
at A and trained to run to either B or Y where it would find 
water. In the final stage of the study, the rat would be placed 
in A. If thirsty, it would run with equal probability to B or Y, 
the water sources; if hungry, it would run only to B, the 
connecting route to G, the food box. The fact that rats could 
piece together this information was taken as evidence of a simple 
form of inferential reasoning, the ability to piece together two 
separately learned items of information to reach a goal. 
Maier (1936) extended this paradigm to more elaborate mazes 
suitable, he thought, for work with both rats and children. The 
actual details of Maierfs studies need not concern us here. 
Suffice it to say that the problem he developed to test the 
subject's inferential skill involved a maze like the one 
illustrated in Figure 5. The maze was child-size (an identical 
rat size maze was available for rats), and consisted of 
Insert Figure 5 about here. 
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darkened runways through which the child was expected to complete 
routes to reach goal boxes in a similar inferential pattern to 
the Hull studies. Children below six did not fare well in this 
estimate of their maze running abilities; as can be seen in 
Figure 6, it is not until well into the school years that 
children perform as well as rats! 
Insert Figure 6 about here. 
The fact that running in a darkened maze in a basement 
laboratory may be a task setting suitable to no organism, but 
better suited to rats than preschoolers, was not open to a great 
deal of debate in the early years of child psychology. 
Things improved considerably in the 1960's, when there was 
considerable upsurge of interest in children's learning in 
paradigms originally developed for the study of rats, pigeons, 
and monkeys (Stevenson, 1970; White 1970). As an example of the 
better work of that period, Kendler and Kendler (1967) adapted 
the basic Hullian task for use with children. They used an 
apparatus similar to that shown in the top half of Figure 7. It 
consisted of an automatic box with three distinctively colored 
Insert Figure 7 about here. 
panels, each of which could be covered by a plain aluminum outer 
panel. At the outset of the learning situation, only the two 
outside panels of the box were opened. The child learned to press 
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a button on the red side to obtain a marble and to press a button 
on the blue side to get a steel ball. After learning these 
responses to criterion, the side panels were closed and the center 
panel was opened. Now the child learned to deposit one of the 
items, for example the marble, into a slot in the center panel so 
that a toy charm would be dispensed. The order of acquisition of 
the two problem parts proved to be immaterial. On the critical 
test trials, all three panels were opened for the first time, and 
the child was asked to make the toy charm come out as quickly as 
possible. A correct response required that the child combine the 
information regarding which item obtained the charm (the marble) 
with the information concerning its location (the red side). In a 
series of studies using this task, the Kendlers found that only 6% 
of the kindergarteners tested could solve the problem unaided, a 
result that has been replicated many times by many investigators. 
Crisafi (1980) attempted to make the task more hospitable 
for very young learners by introducing familiar objects and 
already-known connections between locations and tokens, ploys 
that had resulted in increased rates of learning in cross-
cultural studies (Cole, Gay, Glick, & Sharp, 1971). In Crisafi's 
first task (shown as B in Figure 7), the child learned to find a 
penny or dime in a purse or a piggy bank and then learned that 
the insertion of the correct coin into a gumball machine produced 
a gumball. The inference task required combining the correct 
item, for example the penny, and its location, the purse, to get 
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a gumball. The objects in this task were chosen to be familiar 
and the relations among them to be consistent with the child's 
previous experience (pennies are found in purses and are used to 
operate gumball machines)« The second task (shown as C in Figure 
7) demanded the same solution. It involved a specially designed 
truck that dumped a candy a grey token (located in either a milk 
container or a saucepan) was inserted. These objects were also 
familiar and attractive, but the relations among the constituent 
elements were novel. Crisafi's third task was similar to the 
automated box apparatus designed by the Kendlers and described 
above. The objects and relations were arbitrary and unfamiliar. 
The logical structure of the three tasks is shown in Table 5. 
Insert Table 5 about here. 
Thus, the three versions of the task were designed to form 
an easy-to-hard sequence of three instantiations of the same 
rule. The difficulty of the presumed sequence was confirmed. 
The ability of two-year-old subjects to combine the two pieces of 
information was dramatically influenced by the familiarity and 
compatibility variables. Unaided inferential solutions were 
shown by 89% of the children on the gumball task, 67% on the 
truck task, and 0% on the automated box task. Obviously, two-
year-olds are capable of this simple form of inferential 
reasoning under optimal circumstances. Armed with these learning 
environments, ranging from easy to difficult analogues of the 
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same problem, Crisafi and Brown (1983) were able to aid very 
young children to transfer the solution to the more difficult 
versions. 
The moral of this brief history is, of course, the dramatic 
change in psychologists' estimates of the cognitive capacity of 
the preschool child faced with a simple inferential reasoning 
task. Note that the data base is not in question, children below 
five do have extraordinary difficulty solving the Kendlers' 
(1967) version of the task and we have no doubt, although we have 
not tested it ourselves, that they would prove somewhat 
recalcitrant maze runners! This well established fact is as much 
a part of our picture of children's learning as is their 
precosity in solving gumball and truck version of the problem 
(Crisafi & Brown, 1983). There is no doubt that cognitive 
activities revealed in supportive contexts may be obscured in 
unfamiliar task formats that are perhaps more suitable for other 
species of learners (Maier, 1936). Similarly, differences in 
efficiency such as those displayed on the gumball and automated 
version of the task by three-year-olds, but not by six-year-olds, 
are an important aspect of the learning profile that 
differentiates age groups. Again, it is bandwidths of competence 
across and within settings that reveal age differences, rather 
than static estimates of "capacity" on a single task variant 
appropriate to a restricted age range. 
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What Does it Mean to Call a Context Supportive? 
Findings such as the above, that very young children have 
the competence to perform logically, strategically, 
operationally, etc. on very simple task formats are fairly 
representative of the recent developmental literature and are the 
kind of evidence that has been used to call into question general 
notions of stages of development. But what do such findings 
really tell us? What are we doing, as experimenters, when we 
render a task suitable for two-year-olds, or unschooled Kpelle 
(Cole et al., 1971). In many demonstrations of early competence, 
there is a suspicion of circularity in the arguments proposed to 
explain the phenomena; if the contextual support manipulations 
work, then that task instantiation is judged suitably indigenous 
for preschoolers or unschooled others; if the manipulation does 
not work, then the context is judged unsuitable for revealing 
competence that we now assume to be "there," somewhere! Clearly 
what is needed is some a priori analysis of what is manipuated 
when we induce early competence and a detailed specification of 
the difference between earlier and later forms of competence. 
Why does the three-year-old fail on the task versions 
readily solved by the six-year-old? Various theorists have 
argued that the memory load is too high, that the younger child's 
processing capacity is overburdened, or that the task is 
incompatible with the child's existing knowledge base. Any or 
all of these may be true, but we need some systematic method of 
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determining what we mean by increased memory load or overburdened 
processing capacity, and we need some systematic way of mapping 
the knowledge base. Some attempts at systematic a priori 
analyses exist already. For example, Case, extending the theory 
first expoused Pascual-Leone (1970), has attempted to estimate 
the processing load of a variety of cognitive tasks. Case (1978, 
1982) has been one of the most eloquent supporters of the 
position that cognitive development is constrained by the growth 
of working memory and of central processing capacity. Although 
it is widely recognized that a construct akin to working memory 
is essential in a theory of development (Flavell, 1978, 1982), 
such a concept Is not without its difficulties. Reviewing the 
literature on age differences in basic capacity, Brown, 
Bransford, Ferrara, and Campione (1983) concluded that at this 
point in time, the evidence is moot, existing data could be 
explained in terms of change in knowledge or processing 
strategies, just as readily as changes in underlying capacity 
(Chi, 1976). And, Flavell (1978) rightly queried "How are we to 
decide, in a consistent fashion, exactly what constitutes an 
"item" in working memory for any given problem-solving strategy, 
and hence, how are we to decide exactly how much memory load use 
of that strategy imposes?" (p. 100). 
More recently, Case and his colleagues (Case, 1982; Case, 
Kurland, & Goldberg, 1982) have emphasized the importance of 
"operational efficiency" which, they suggest, controls the growth 
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of processing capacity. In the modified position total capacity 
remains constant with performance being determined by a trade-off 
between storage requirements and the efficiency of mental 
operations. Decrements in necessary operating space occur as a 
result of the growing speed, efficiency, and automaticity of basis 
processes (e.g., storage and retrieval). 
Although Case's recent position emphasizes the importance of 
separating the structural and the processing components of the 
developing problem-solving system, it does not completely clarify 
his overall theoretical position. Indeed, Flavell (1978) focused 
on the main point of difficulty, by asking of Case's view, "Won't 
it be even harder to decide that a mental operation is 
"sufficiently automatized" than to decide how many such 
operations have to be held in working memory during the execution 
of a strategy?" (p. 101). Reliance on the concent of changes in 
working memory capacity to "explain" task varient effects is to 
raise rather than to answer the basic question. 
Flavell's research on perspective taking skills takes 
another approach to explaining rather than just demonstrating 
precocious processing. The perspective taking task has an 
interesting history in the light of arguments concerning early 
competence. According to Piagetian researchers, visual or 
spatial perspective taking is a developmentally advanced 
accomplishment coinciding with the emergence of logical thinking 
skills in middle childhood. Piaget and Inhelder (1956) developed 
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the three mountain problem to assess whether children could 
predict the perspective of an individual other than oneself. In 
this task the child has to infer how an array of objects looks to 
an observer who views the array from a different position to that 
of the subject. The failure of young children to adopt the 
perspective of another on the three mountain task was attributed 
to egocentrism which is considered to be characteristic of 
preoperational thinking. 
More recently, however, it has been demonstrated that a 
variety of contextual manipuations affect children's judgments on 
perspective taking tasks, casting doubt on the Piagetian claim 
that young children lack the cognitive structures necessary for 
perspective taking (Fehr, 1978; Rosser, 1983). For example, if 
four-year-olds are allowed to rotate a second array, mounted on a 
lazy-susan device, they can accurately judge perspective (Borke, 
1975), and if they are allowed to view the test array from all 
possible perspectives, they make fewer errors than if they make 
perspective judgments without having first viewed all aspects of 
the array (Eiser, 1974). In addition, Nigl and Fishbein (1974) 
found that children are better able to coordinate perspectives 
when three- rather two-dimensional choice stimuli are used. This 
is an interesting finding because in the typical perspective 
taking tasks two-dimensional photographs are used as judgment 
stimuli. As a final example of a factor that affects perspective 
taking skill, Cox (1975) found that children are more likely to 
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make correct responses if they are judging what a human sees 
rather than a doll. In sum, it seems that children as young as 
four years of age are able to coordinate relatively complex 
perspectives provided the task setting is conducive, a fairly 
robust example of the influence of contexts in learning. 
This selective summary of some of the task factors that 
affect the developmental emergence of perspective taking skill 
again leaves unanswered the question of why certain task contexts 
are more conducive than others, and how perspective taking skills 
develop. It is to these questions that Flavell and his 
colleagues have addressed themselves. Their work goes beyond the 
descriptive and offers analyses over and above simple 
demonstrations that Piaget must have been wrong. 
As Flavell (1977, p. 45) pointed out, Piaget and Inhelder's 
Three Mountain problem "appears in hindsight to be a rather 
'noisy,1 insensitive measure of the basic ability it was designed 
to assess." Flavell (1977) argued that one would expect a 
developmental sequence in the emergence of perspective taking of 
the following form: (a) the child would first understand that 
another's experience is different from that of their own without 
being able to determine the exact nature of the other person's 
experience; and (b) the child would subsequently become able to 
infer the other's experience (Flavell, 1977; Flavell, Everett, 
Croft, & Flavell, 1981; Lempers, Flavell, & Flavell, 1977). In 
the earlier developing Level 1 knowledge, children can infer what 
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object a person does or does not see, and are also capable of 
saying what objects can be seen by them and not by another 
person. At the later developing Level ,2, children are aware that 
an object gives rise to differing images, depending on the point 
from which it is viewed. This two stage sequence is not 
independent of task complexity; Flavell, Botkin, Fry, Wright, and 
Jarvis (1968) have shown that even adults are unable to infer 
anotherfs perspective if the task is sufficiently complex. 
Nevertheless, working with relatively simple stimuli, Flavell has 
provided supportive data for the two stage development of 
perspective taking skills. 
In support of their claim for the Level 1-Level 2 
distinction, Flavell et al. (1981) showed that three-year-old 
children performed well on tasks that call for Level 1 knowledge 
but poorly on tasks requiring Level 2 knowledge. The Level 1 
task involved presenting children with a card with a picture on 
each side of it (e.g., a dog on one side and a turtle on the 
other). The child had to say what picture the experimenter saw. 
The Level 2 task involved placing a picture on a table (e.g., a 
picture of a turtle) so that it was either right side up for the 
experimenter or the child. The task was to indicate which of the 
two orientations the experimenter saw. Three-year-old children 
continued to perform poorly even when the task was changed to be 
more familiar with their everyday experiences and even after 
training. 
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A second kind of developmental sequence in perspective 
taking is the distinction between Rules and Computation (Flavell, 
Omanson, & Latham, 1978; Salatas, & Flavell, 1976). Computation 
refers to the cognitive processes invoked to solve many 
perspective taking problems (e.g., mental rotation). In 
contrast, Rules refers to knowledge of the general invariant 
relational properties that hold for all arrays (e.g., if I know 
that you are examining an array from a different postion to me, I 
do not have to look at the array to know that your view will be 
different from mine—it is an invariant rule that is known to 
be true). The distinction between Rules and Computation is 
important because if a child fails on a perspective taking task, 
the error may be due to inadequate rule knowledge, inappropriate 
computation strategies or some combination of both (Flavell et 
al., 1978). 
The distinction between rules and computation was examined 
by Flavell et al. (1978) by having first, third, and fifth grade 
children identify which of two photographs represented an 
observer's view of an array of three dolls. The amount of prior 
information given to the children about the positioning of the 
three dolls was varied so that, in principle, they could identify 
the correct photograph without seeing the array. In fact, in one 
condition, children did have to choose which was the correct 
photograph without seeing the array. The purpose of this 
manipulation was to determine whether children could apply their 
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rule-based knowledge. In a second condition, however, the 
children were allowed to see the array after receiving the hints 
to see whether they would decide which photograph was correct on 
the basis of computation or on the basis of their knowledge of 
perspective taking rules. The results were clear. First, few 
first grade children did well on the rule condition. Second, 
children who understood the perspective rule, as indexed by 
performance on the rule condition, continued to use that 
knowledge even when presented with the opportunity to observe the 
array; that is, they saw no need to confirm by computation what 
they already knew. Furthermore, Flavell et al. (1978) found that 
nearly all children who made rule-based decisions, as indicated 
by their speed of choosing the correct photograph, were able to 
articulate the nature of the rule. As Flavell et al. (1978, p. 
464) noted, for "older subjects . . . such rules . . . become 
explicit, completely general, semi-necessary truths." 
Some a priori distinctions concerning what would make a 
context simple or difficult, of the type used by Flavell and 
Case, are clearly needed if we are to avoid the circularity of 
the arguments often proposed to explain early and partial 
competence. But in addition, we need to go farther and ask 
whether the early competence we see is principled, in the sense 
that under a variety of easy instantitations the child can 
perform well. For example, if it were possible to reduce the 
memory load, or processing capacity demands equally for two or 
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three tasks, would the child perform consistently well? And if 
we then increase the processing load, would the child show less 
and less competence proportionally? We do not know the answers 
to these questions and will not come to know them unless we 
undertake systematic examination of what supportive contexts are. 
It is also an interesting question whether the creation of a 
principled set of task environments, some that tap newly emergent 
understanding, some partial knowledge, and some complete flexible 
comprehension of "the explicit, general semi-necessary truths" 
kind, could serve to create development through learning. This 
point has not been addressed systematically, although Crisafi and 
Brown (1983) have shown that it is possible, through analogical 
transfer, to teach three-year-olds to perform well on difficult 
versions of the inferential reasoning tasks in question. Would 
the provision of a guided tour through a set of ever more complex 
tasks variants lead to more mature performance in young children 
on the difficult, process-demanding versions of a particular 
problem? i.e, would the child learn to deal with progressively 
more difficult instantiations? Or is performance totally 
determined by the processing load factors? These questions 
remain to be answered. 
A central question for further research is whether early 
competence is really fleeting, is really of the "now you see it, 
now you don't" quality or whether its emergence and maintenance 
is governed by a systematic set of discoverable rules. Also, an 
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important issue is the extent to which early competence is domain 
specific or domain general. Similarly, we need to consider 
carefully whether the results of learning in easy-to-hard 
contexts, in social interactions, etc. have any generality or 
stability? In short the questions concerning the developmental 
status of precocious thinking, however it is induced, are only 
now being raised in systematic ways. Demonstrations of early 
competence that show that Piaget was wrong in his estimate of 
when competence should emerge are legion. What is needed now is 
the development of a consistent theoretical rationale of what 
governs the emergence of competence within and across domains. 
Conclusion 
Learning and development are interwoven in a complex spiral 
such that none of the four alternatives mentioned in the 
introduction fully capture the flavor of the relation. As 
Vygotsky argued, learning in contexts, including the social, 
creates development which in turn determines the level of 
learning and teaching for which the child is ripe. 
Thus, a main theme of this paper is that contexts create 
learning and development. Any estimate of developmental status 
must depend critically on the environment in which it is 
revealed. Important environmental factors include the social, in 
which parents, teachers, peers, and experimenters provide degrees 
of contextual support for learning, sometimes deliberately and 
sometimes without conscious intent to do so. These interactional 
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accomplishments are an important driving force of cognitive 
development. But in addition, we should not overlook the fact 
that a great deal of development is instigated by the enquiring 
mind of the child herself. Developmental status cannot be 
assessed in a vacuum and the contexts used to reveal or disguise 
competence must come to figure more prominently in theories of 
cognitive development. Supporting environments are the things to 
be understood, not an explanation of development. 
The second main theme of this paper has been the emphasis on 
microgenetic analysis, the method of observing development taking 
place in children "right before one's eyes." Much of the picture 
of developmnet described in this chapter came from a 
consideration of short-term changes in children, developing and 
learning, with or without the help of others. We have argued 
that the concept of bandwidths of competence through which the 
child navigates over time and across settings is a more fruitful 
metaphor for cognitive development than the legacy of a poorly 
understood stage theory, i.e., a reliance on static snapshot 
descriptions of developmental status frozen in time and welded to 
a particular task environment. 
We believe that a main agenda for developmental psychologist 
is to expand their theories to accent for environments in which 
learning and development occur. As developmental psychologists, 
if we can come to understand: (a) self-directed learning, (b) 
sensitive methods of assessing readiness for change, (c) the 
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dynamics of social situations that are successful in inducing 
change, and (d) supportive experimental contexts, we will have 
gone a long way in unraveling the complex interactions of 
learning and development. This agenda is the one set by 
Vygotsky, a pioneer in the development analysis of human 
cognition. 
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Table 1 
The Acquisition of Question-Asking by a Weak 7th. Grade Student 
(Charles) 
Day U 
TEXT: The water moccasin, somewhat longer than the copperhead, 
is found in the southeastern states. It lives in swampy 
regions. It belongs, as do also the copperhead and the 
rattlesnakes, to a group of poisonous snakes called pit 
vipers. They have pits between their eyes and their 
nostrils which, because they are sensitive to heat, help 
the snakes tell when they are near a warm-blooded 
animal. Another name for the water moccasin is 
"cottonmouth." This name comes from the white lining of 
the snake's mouth. 
1) S: What is found in the southeastern snakes, also the 
copperhead, rattlesnakes, vipers - they have. I'm not doing 
this right. 
2) T: All right. Do you want to know about the pit vipers? 
3) S: Yeah. 
4) T: What would be a good question about the pit vipers that 
starts with the word "why?" 
5) S: (No response) 
6) T: How about, "Why are the snakes called pit vipers?" 
7) S: Why do they want to know that they are called pit vipers? 
8) Ts Try it again. 
9) S: Why do they, pit vipers in a pit? 
10) T: How about, "Why do they call the snakes pit vipers?" 
11) S: Why do they call the snakes pit vipers? 
12) T: There you go! Good for you. 
Day JJ: 
TEXT: Spinner's mate is much smaller than she, and his body is 
dull brown. He spends most of his time setting at one 
side of her web. 
13) S: (No question) 
14) T: What's this paragraph about? 
15) S: Spinner's mate. How do spinner's mate... 
16) T: That's good. Keep going. 
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Table 1 (cont'd.) 
17) S: How do spinner's mate is smaller than...How am I going to 
say that? 
18) T: Take your time with it. You want to ask a question about 
spinner's mate and what he does, beginning with the word 
"how." 
19) S: How do they spend most of his time sitting? 
20) T: You're very close. The question would be, "How does 
spinner's mate spend most of his time?" Now, you ask it. 
21) S: How does spinner's mate spend most of his time? 
Day 7: 
TEXT: Perhaps you are wondering where the lava and other 
volcanic products come from. Deep within our earth 
there are pockets of molten rock called magma. Forced 
upward in part by gas pressure, this molten rock 
continually tries to reach the surface. Eventually—by 
means of cracks in the crustal rocks or some similar 
zone of weakness—the magma may break out of the ground. 
It then flows from the vent as lava, or spews skyward as 
dense clouds of lava particles. 
22) S: How does the pressure from below push the mass of hot rock 
against the opening? Is that it? 
23) T: Not quite. Start your question with, "What happens when?" 
24) S: What happens when the pressure from below pushes the mass 
of hot rock against the opening? 
25) T: Good for you! Good job. 
Day 11: 
TEXT: One of the most interesting of the insect-eating plants 
is the Venus's flytrap. This plant lives in only one 
small area of the world — the coastal marshes of North 
and South Carolina. The Venus's flytrap doesn't look 
unusual. Its habits, however, make it truly a plant 
wonder. 
26) S: What is the most interesting of the insect eating plants, 
and where do the plants live at? 
27) T: Two excellent questions! They are both clear and 
important questions. Ask us one at a time now. 
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Day 15; 
TEXT: Scientists also come to the South Pole to study the 
strange lights that glow overhead during the Antarctic 
night. (It's a cold and lonely world for the few hardy 
people who "winter over" the polar night.) These 
"southern lights" are caused by the Earth acting like a 
magnet on electrical particles in the air. They are 
clues that may help us understand the Earth's core and 
the upper edges of its blanket of air. 
28) S: Why do scientists come to the south pole to study? 
29) T: Excellent question! That is what this paragraph is all 
about. 
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Table 2 
Improvement in Question-Asking by a More Competent 7th. Grade 
Student (Sara) 
Day 2: 
TEXT: HOW CAN SNAKES BE SO FLEXIBLE? 
The snake's skeleton and parts of its body are very 
flexible—something like a rubber hose with bones. A 
snake's backbone can have as many as 300 vertebrae, 
almost ten times as many as a human's. These vertebrae 
are connected by loose and rubbery tissues that allow 
easy movement. Because of this bendable, twistable 
spinal construction, a snake can turn its body in almost 
any direction at almost any point. 
1) S: Snakes' backbones can have as many as 300 vertebrates -
almost times as many as humans. 
2) T: Not a bad beginning, but I would consider that a question 
about a detail. Try to avoid "fill in the blank" questions. 
See if next time you can fine a main idea question and begin 
your question with a question word - how, why, when.... 
Day 3: 
TEXT: There are snakes in nearly all parts of the world. Some 
snakes prefer warm, arid desert areas. Others prefer 
leafy forests, fields, and woodlands. Some stay in 
areas near water and are fine swimmers. Then there are 
several varieties that live all their lives in the sea. 
3) S: 
4) T: 
Can snakes live their whole lives in seas? 
See if you can ask a question using your own words. 
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Day Jl: 
TEXT: The other kind of camel—the one with two humps—is the 
Bactrian. Its home country is the Gobi Desert of 
northeastern Asia. The Bactrial has shorter legs and 
longer wool than the one-humped camel. It also has 
stronger, more rugged feet. This is important because 
instead of having sand to walk on, the Bactrian camels 
live in rough and rocky parts of the world. 
5) S: Where is the Bactrian found? 
6) T: Good for you. 
Day J3: 
TEXT: When most full-grown spiders want to travel, they have 
to walk on their eight legs. But some small kinds of 
spiders, and many young ones, use an easier way. They 
climb up on bushes, fence posts, or weed stems and spin 
streamers of silk. When the wind catches the silk and 
blows it away, each spider tightly holds onto his own 
streamer. The silk streamer carries him through the air 
as if it were a parachute or a balloon. 
7) S: I think I have another. When it's traveling, what do they 
compare the spider to? 
8) T: An interesting question. 
Day 11: 
TEXT: The young caterpillar's first meal is its own eggshell-. 
Then it eats a leaf and each day eats more and more 
food. After a few days, the caterpillar becomes too 
large for its skin. A new skin forms beneath the first 
one, the old skin comes open and, like a snake, the 
caterpillar wriggles its way out of the split skin. 
Then the caterpillar goes on eating leaves or other 
kinds of food. When the new skin becomes too tight for 
the growing body, it again splits and comes off. By 
then the caterpillar is covered by another skin. This 
eating and shedding goes on for several weeks. The old 
skin may be replaced by a new one four or five times. 
Each time the skin is shed, the size and color of the 
caterpillar change. 
9) S: Why does the caterpillar's skin split? 
10) T: Excellent question. That was the point of the entire paragraph. 
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Table 3 
Reciprocal Dialogue from an Early Session; Study 2, Group 3# Day 3* 
TEXT: CAN SNAKES STING WITH THEIR TONGUES? 
No—snakes1 tongues are completely harmless. They're used 
for feeling things and for sharpening the snakes1 sense 
of smell. Although snakes can smell in the usual way, 
the tongue flickering in the air picks up tiny particles 
of matter. These particles are deposited in two tiny 
cavities at the base of the nostrils to increase the 
snakesfs ability to smell. 
1. A: Do snakes1 tongues sting? 
2. K: Sometimes. 
3. A: Correct. 
This paragraph is about do snakes sting with their tongue, and 
different ways that the tongue is for and the senses of smell. 
4. *T: Are there any questions? 
5. C: Snakes1 tongues don't sting. 
6. *T: Beautiful! I thought, boy, I must have been doing some 
fast reading there because I missed that point. A , 
could you ask your question again? 
7. A: Do snakes' tongues really sting? 
8. *T: Now, A , since you have asked the question, can you 
find in that paragraph where the question in answered? 
9. A: No, snakes' tongues are completely harmless. 
10. *T: So we'll try it again. Can you generate another question 
that you think a teacher might ask? 
11. A: What are the tongues used for? 
12. *T: Good! 
13. L: The sense of smell. 
14. *T: Is that correct? A , do you disagree? Yes. 
15. A: That answer was right, but there are other things that the 
tongue can do. 
16. L: But she only said tell one, she didn't say tell all of them. 
17. *T: O.K. 
18. B: It is used to pick up tiny particles. 
19. *T: O.K. I think that this is an important point. You have 
the basic concept which is correct, O.K., but what the 
question really is saying is, is it used for smell? O.K.? 
20. B: They are used for feeling things for sharpening snakes' 
sense of smell. 
21. *T: O.K. They are used for sharpening the snakes' sense of 
smell. Are they used for smelling? That's the point we 
aren't clear on. 
22. L: In my answer I said it is for the sense of smell. 
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23. *T: This is fine; this is what the technique is all about. 
What it means is not that you are right or wrong or good or 
bad. What it says is that we have just read something and 
have had a disagreement about what it says. We need to work 
it out. 
24. A: My prediction is that they will now talk about the 
different things about snakes. Where they live, and what 
they eat and stuff like that. 
25. *T: O.K. Good. What do you think they eat? 
26. A: Animals. 
27. A: Deserts. 
28. C: I challenge. Snakes, all of them, don't live in the 
desert. They live in the woods and in swamp areas. 
* Indicates turns taken by adult teacher 
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Table 4 
Reciprocal Dialogue from a Later Session; Study 2, Group 3, Day 13 
TEXT: In the United States salt is produced by three basic 
methods: solar (sun) evaporation, mining, and artificial 
heat evaporation. For salt to be extracted by solar 
evaporation, the weather must be hot and dry. Thus, 
solar salt is harvested in the tropic-like areas along 
our southern ocean coasts and at Great Salt Lake. 
1. C: Name three different basic methods how salt is produced. 
2. A: Evaporation, mining, evaporation ... artificial heat 
evaporation. 
3. C: Correct, very good. My summary on this paragraph is about 
ways that salt is being produced. 
4. *T: Very good. Could you select the next teacher? 
(Student selects another student) 
TEXT: The second oldest form of salt production is mining. 
Unlike early methods that made the work extremely 
dangerous and difficult, today's methods use special 
machinery, and salt mining is easier and safer. The old 
expression "back to the salt mine" no longer applies. 
5. L: Name two words that often describe mining salt in the old 
days. 
6. K: Back to the salt mines? 
7. L: No. Angela? 
8. A: Dangerous and difficult. 
9. L: Correct. This paragraph is all about comparing the old 
mining of salt and today's mining of salt. 
10. *T: Beautiful! 
11. L: I have a prediction to make. 
12. *T: Good. 
13. L: I think it might tell when salt was first discovered, 
well, it might tell what salt is made of and how it's made. 
14. *T: O.K. Can we have another teacher? 
TEXT: Table salt is made by the third method — artificial 
evaporation. Pumping water into an underground salt bed 
dissolves the salt to make a brine that is brought to 
the surface. After purification at high temperatures, 
the salt is ready for our tables. 
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15» K: After purification at high temperatures the salt is ready 
for what? 
16. C: Our tables. 
17. K: That's correct. To summarize: After its purification, 
the salt is put on our tables. 
18. *T: That was a fine job, Ken, and I appreciate all that work, 
but I think there might be something else to add to our 
summary. There is more important information that I think 
we need to include. This paragraph is mostly about what? 
19. A: The third method of artificial evaporation. 
20. B: It mainly tells about pumping water from an underground 
salt bed that dissolves the salt to make a brine that is 
brought to the surface. 
21. *T: Angela hit it right on the money. This paragraph is 
mostly about the method of artificial evaporation and then 
everything else in the paragraph is telling us about that 
process. O.K. Next teacher. 
TEXT: For thousands of years people have known salt— 
tasting it, using it for their lives' needs. Sometimes 
it has been treasured as gold; other times it has been 
superstitiously tossed over the shoulder to ward off bad 
luck. Somehow people and salt have always been 
together, but never is the tie more complete than when 
the best people are called "the salt of the earth." 
22. C: My question is, what are the best people called? 
23. L: The salt of the earth. 
24. C: Why? 
25. L: Because salt and the people have been together so long. 
26. *T: Chris, do you have something to add to that? O.K. It 
really isn't because they have been together so long; it has 
to do with something else. Brian? 
27. B: (reading) "People and salt have always been together but 
never has the tie been so complete." 
28. *T: Allright, but when we use the expression, "That person is 
the salt of the earth," we know that means that person is a 
good person. How do we know that? 
29. B: Because we treasure salt, like gold. 
* Indicates turns taken by adult teacher 
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Table 5 
Design for Combining Information Tasks 
Task Structure: Container-Subgoal Relation 
(A-B, x-y) 
Subgoal-Goal 
(B-G) 
Combining Test 
(A-B-G) 
Task Varient 
Familiar Objects: 
1. Know Relations 
(Gumball Machine) 
2. New Relations: 
(Truck) 
bank-penny 
purse-dime 
carton-white button 
pan-grey button 
Unfamiliar Objects: 
3. New Relation 
(Box-Automated) 
red panel-marble 
blue panel-ball bearing 
penny-gumball machine 
-> gumball 
white button-truck 
-> candy bean 
marble-center panel 
-> M & M 
bank -> penny 
penny -> gumball 
carton -> white 
button 
white button -> 
candy bean 
red panel -> 
marble 
marble -> M & M 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1, Examples of matrices inductive reasoning problems (from 
Campione, Brown, Ferrara, Jones, & Steinberg, in press). 
Figure 2. Examples of correct and incorrect assemblies of the 
rail circuit task. 
Figure 3.. Examples of the block types used by Karmiloff-Smith and 
Inhelder (1974). 
Figure Schematic version of the A-B-G problem based on Hull 
(1952). 
Figure 5.. Schematic version of the A-B-G problem used by Maier 
(1936). 
Figure 6. Data from rats and children in Maierfs A-B-G maze 
(Maier, 1936). 
Figure 7.. Three versions of the A-B-G problem used by Crisafi & 
Brown (1984). 
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